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I am currently a post-doctoral researcher at the IFILNOVA where I develop a project financed by the FCT on the topic “Arguments and decisions in contexts of uncertainty” (SFRH/BPD/101744/2014).
http://www.arglab.ifilnova.pt/projects/Arguments_decisions_contexts_of_uncertainty
My work focuses on the impact of cognitive illusions on argumentative reasoning and decision-making. My assumption is that normative models of argumentation and Rational Choice, which seek to establish the standards of how people ought to think or decide, need to take into account the intrinsic limitations of the human mind. Despite the profusion of empirical studies showing that cognitive illusions affect the rationality of people’s thinking in everyday contexts (Adler & Rips 2008, Gilovitch, Griffin & Kahneman 2002), some of the most prominent theories of argumentation and Rational Choice fail to take this issue into account and continue to bring forward models, rules and norms meant to be applied by ideally rational agents in the best of worlds. In contrast, my project seeks to elucidate the conditions under which normative theories of argumentation and decision-making can effectively–rather than merely formally–promote rationality and critical thinking in everyday contexts. I am particularly interested in informal strategies of cognitive regulation such as those developed by the proponents of “bounded rationality” (Simon 1982, Elster 2007, Gigerenzer 2002). Much of my current work focuses specifically on “debiasing strategies” meant to suppress (or at least reduce) the effects of cognitive biases on judgmental and inferential processes.
Correia, V. (2016) Weakness of will and self-control. In S. Silva (ed.) Morality and emotions, London: Routledge.
Correia, V. (2015) “The Division of the Mind: Paradoxes and Puzzles”. In J. Fonseca & J. Gonçalves (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on the Self, Frankfurt, New York, Peter Lang, pp. 147-165.
Correia, V. (2014) “Biased argumentation and critical thinking”. In S. Oswald & T. Herman (Eds.) Rhetoric and Cognition: Theoretical perspectives and persuasive strategies, Bern, Peter Lang, pp. 89-110.
Correia, V. (2014) “From Self-deception to self-control”, Croatian Journal of Philosophy, vol. XIV, nº 3, p. 309-323.
Correia, V. (2012) “The Ethics of Argumentation”, Informal Logic, vol. 32, nº 2, p. 222-241.
Correia, V. (2012) “L’irrationalité (est) naturelle: comment la réduire”, Archives de Philosophie du droit, nº 55, p. 165-177.
Correia, V. (2011) “Biases and fallacies”, Cogency, vol. 3, nº 1, p. 107-126.
Correia, V. (2011) “Limites da racionalidade, irracionalidade motivada e emoções”. In S. Miguens e S. Cadilha (eds.), Acção e ética, Lisboa, Colibri, p. 163-192.
Correia, V. (2010) La duperie de soi, Editions Universitaires Européennes, Saarsbruck.
Correia, V. (2010) “Limites da racionalidade”, Disputatio, vol. 3, nº 28, p. 275-291.
Correia, V. (2010) “Emotional Aspects of Neuroesthetics”. In Olga Pombo, Silvia Di Marco & Marco Pina (eds.), Neuroaesthetics: Can Science explain Art?, Fim de Século Editora, Lisboa, p. 119-138.
http://www.arglab.ifilnova.pt/projects/Arguments_decisions_contexts_of_uncertainty
My work focuses on the impact of cognitive illusions on argumentative reasoning and decision-making. My assumption is that normative models of argumentation and Rational Choice, which seek to establish the standards of how people ought to think or decide, need to take into account the intrinsic limitations of the human mind. Despite the profusion of empirical studies showing that cognitive illusions affect the rationality of people’s thinking in everyday contexts (Adler & Rips 2008, Gilovitch, Griffin & Kahneman 2002), some of the most prominent theories of argumentation and Rational Choice fail to take this issue into account and continue to bring forward models, rules and norms meant to be applied by ideally rational agents in the best of worlds. In contrast, my project seeks to elucidate the conditions under which normative theories of argumentation and decision-making can effectively–rather than merely formally–promote rationality and critical thinking in everyday contexts. I am particularly interested in informal strategies of cognitive regulation such as those developed by the proponents of “bounded rationality” (Simon 1982, Elster 2007, Gigerenzer 2002). Much of my current work focuses specifically on “debiasing strategies” meant to suppress (or at least reduce) the effects of cognitive biases on judgmental and inferential processes.
Correia, V. (2016) Weakness of will and self-control. In S. Silva (ed.) Morality and emotions, London: Routledge.
Correia, V. (2015) “The Division of the Mind: Paradoxes and Puzzles”. In J. Fonseca & J. Gonçalves (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on the Self, Frankfurt, New York, Peter Lang, pp. 147-165.
Correia, V. (2014) “Biased argumentation and critical thinking”. In S. Oswald & T. Herman (Eds.) Rhetoric and Cognition: Theoretical perspectives and persuasive strategies, Bern, Peter Lang, pp. 89-110.
Correia, V. (2014) “From Self-deception to self-control”, Croatian Journal of Philosophy, vol. XIV, nº 3, p. 309-323.
Correia, V. (2012) “The Ethics of Argumentation”, Informal Logic, vol. 32, nº 2, p. 222-241.
Correia, V. (2012) “L’irrationalité (est) naturelle: comment la réduire”, Archives de Philosophie du droit, nº 55, p. 165-177.
Correia, V. (2011) “Biases and fallacies”, Cogency, vol. 3, nº 1, p. 107-126.
Correia, V. (2011) “Limites da racionalidade, irracionalidade motivada e emoções”. In S. Miguens e S. Cadilha (eds.), Acção e ética, Lisboa, Colibri, p. 163-192.
Correia, V. (2010) La duperie de soi, Editions Universitaires Européennes, Saarsbruck.
Correia, V. (2010) “Limites da racionalidade”, Disputatio, vol. 3, nº 28, p. 275-291.
Correia, V. (2010) “Emotional Aspects of Neuroesthetics”. In Olga Pombo, Silvia Di Marco & Marco Pina (eds.), Neuroaesthetics: Can Science explain Art?, Fim de Século Editora, Lisboa, p. 119-138.
