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LISBON MIND COGNITION & KNOWLEDGE GROUP

Radical Enactive Cognitive Science and its Critics

REC and its Critics: in Lisbon
Nova University of Lisbon – 16th-17th October 2019
Picture
Venue: Auditório A14 (ALMNEG) Colégio Almada Negreiros (Campus de Campolide) 

The conference will take place at the Colégio Almada Negreiros. This can be found at the Nova University of Lisboa campus here. The Colégio is the large building with towers at the top of the hill overlooking the campus

You can arrive at the Campolide campus from São Sebastião metro station. A possible route provided by Google Maps is here.


Programme

October, 16th 
13.45.- 14.00 Intro to Workshop and Local Arrangements, Robert Clowes ​
14:00 -16:00 Dan Hutto & Erik Myin on The Challenge of and Challenges for REC
19:30 Dinner at  Oh! Lacerda Av. de Berna 36, 1050-078 Lisboa


October, 17th 
9.30 - 11.00 - Paweł Gładziejewski on  How hard is the Hard Problem of Content, really?
11.00- 11.15 Coffee Break 
11.15 - 12.45 - Tobias Schlicht on Representation vs. Intentionality

12.45- 13.00   Lunch

14.00 - 15.20 - Klaus Gärtner on REC - From Knowledge to Phenomenality ... and back

Coffee Break 15.20 - 15.35

15.35 - 16.55 - Robert Clowes on REC and the Mechanisms of Representation
17.00 - 18.30 Dan Hutto & Erik Myin on The Future of  REC
The Radical Enactive and Embodied account of Cognition (REC) has had an extraordinary impact and caused great controversy among cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind. Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin’s co-authored books, Radicalizing Enactivism (2013) and Evolving Enactivism (2017), challenged the classic cognitivist conception of cognition which has enjoyed the status of the received view in the sciences of the mind since the 1960s. REC contests central aspects of the received view, especially, the intellectualist conception that the mind essentially represents and computes.
At its root, REC claims, cognition does not involve picking up and processing informational contents that are used, stored and reused to get cognitive work done. Rather the bulk of cognition does its work without the need for representation. Basic forms of cognition, REC claims, are fundamentally interactive, dynamic, relational and–most importantly–contentless. Yet REC also claims that some non-basic forms of cognition are content-involving in the sense that they have the additional, special feature of specifying satisfaction or correctness conditions. REC therefore poses new questions about how to understand cognition in the absence of representation, and new challenges over how and where representation enters the cognitive picture. The very idea that there might be basic and non-basic forms of cognition raises questions and comparisons with other E accounts of cognition as well as new debates about the nature of cognition and the role of representations within cognitive science.
This conference aims to interrogate key contemporary themes in the philosophy of mind and cognition around REC’s explanatory project, such as: Is a fundamental distinction between basic and non-basic forms sustainable? How are the various forms of cognition best modelled? What features of cognition are in play when we engage with the world in various cognitive tasks? Does cognition entail correctness conditions of any kind, even if they are not conceived of in representational terms? Do these features everywhere require representing the world as being a certain way? If they do, where does representation enter the picture? Where and when - if at all - should cognitive science make use of representation in its explanatory vocabulary? What are the benefits of realist or instrumentalist notions of representation within cognitive science?  Are there different kinds of intentionality? If so, should we conceive of and explain them?  How should we understand the relationship between intentionality and representation? Is any kind of intentionality the mark of the cognitive? How and where does content arise in the world? Is REC compatible with predictive processing accounts of cognition? Might predictive processing offer a new route out of the “representation wars”?
           

Workshop Organisers:
Robert Clowes - robertclowes@fcsh.unl.pt
​Inês Hipólito – inesh@uow.edu.au

Local Organisation:
Robert Clowes
Gloria Andrada de Gregorio

https://mindandcognition.weebly.com/rec-and-its-critics.html
 
References
Hutto, D. D. and E. Myin (2013). Radicalizing enactivism: Basic minds without content, MIT Press.             
Hutto, D. D. and E. Myin (2017). Evolving enactivism: Basic minds meet content, MIT Press.
 
 
 
 

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  • News & Events
  • People
    • Gloria Andrada
    • Robert Clowes
    • Ricardo N. Henriques
    • Florian Franken Figuereido
    • Klaus Gaertner
    • Steven Gouveia
    • Jorge Gonçalves
    • Inês Hipólito
    • Dina Mendonça
    • João Sardo Mourão
    • Paul Smart
    • Nuno Venturinha
    • Robert Vinten
    • Camila Lobo
    • Alberto Oya
  • Research & Projects
    • Self and Consciousness
    • Cognitive Science and Technology
    • Philosophy of Psychiatry & Mental Illness
    • Workshop on Delusion
  • Events
    • The Mind Technology Problem Symposium >
      • TMTP Programme
    • Workshop: Wittgenstein, Religion, and Cognitive Science. December 15th.
    • REC and its Critics >
      • REC and its Critics
    • Wittgenstein, Nature, and Religion - 2nd ERB Project Workshop
    • Workshop Cognitive, Epistemic and Ethical Dimensions of the Internet 2015
    • Philosophy and Schizophrenia 2017
    • Wittgenstein, Nature, and Religion - 2nd ERB Project Workshop
    • Seminar Louis Sass 2016
    • Workshop with Philip Gerrans 2016
    • Scaling Up the Bayesian Brain
    • The Mechanistic Approach in Biology and Cognition
    • Mind Selves and Technology 2016 >
      • Programme for Minds, Selves and Technology 2016
    • Workshop Perspectivas sobre a Esquizofrenia 2016
    • Arguing With Dan Hutto the Workshop 2015 >
      • Abstracts for Arguing with Dan Hutto 2015
    • European Workshop on the Cognitive Implications of the Internet 2015
    • Thinking About Enculturation
  • Mind & Reasoning RIP Seminar
  • Publications
    • Schizophrenia and Common Sense - Book
    • Mind-Technology Problem CFP
  • Blog
  • Contacts
  • CFP For REC Conference