Virtualism and the Mind: Rethinking Presence, Representation and Self: – (SFRH/BPD/70440/2010).
In the early 21st century metaphors of virtual reality, were used by a number of influential philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists to explain various aspects of mind. Especially that the mind does not need to represent the world in an internalist fashion but can in various ways rely on an actually existing world beyond the mind to fill out partial or sparse representations. Strikingly, the use of the virtuality metaphor cuts across one of the most pronounced divisions in contemporary philosophy of cognitive science, namely the division between representationalism and enactivism. Philosophers who developed (very different) versions of these ideas include Alva Noë (2004), Thomas Metzinger (2004) , Andy Clark (2008), Evan Thompson (2007) and Antti Revonsuo (2006). The working out of this metaphor tended to be somewhat underdeveloped however. Part of this project investigates how the tensions in the way this metaphor was interpreted could be worked out directly in terms of a theory of virtualist representation, e.g., (Clowes & Chrisley, 2012).
The idea of presence has been central to the project, an idea which has recently been used both to discuss human computer interaction technologies and mental illness. The project used the notion of presence to develop a novel theory of self, whereby self is understood as virtual but actualizing. (Clowes, 2015a). This approach relates to some ideas of Thomas Metzinger, but whereas Metzinger claims the self is virtual and therefore inexistent, I claim that the self is virtual and real. Recently the project has also looked at the concept of presence in embodiment and how this idea can be developed to give an embodied theory of mental representation (Clowes & Mendonça, 2015 Online First).
From the 2014 renewal of the project it has deepened its secondary focus around how the mind can virtually appropriate technologies. Especially, the new class of digital media portable and wearable technologies we might call Cloud Tech. The project has examined how these technologies might be incorporated in human cognitive architecture focusing on the cognitive and empirical implications for the human mind (Clowes, 2013, 2014a, 2014b, 2015b). Latterly the project has begun to investigate the ethical side of this relationship. This work is currently being developed into a monograph provisionally title Thinking in The Cloud.
Press.
The idea of presence has been central to the project, an idea which has recently been used both to discuss human computer interaction technologies and mental illness. The project used the notion of presence to develop a novel theory of self, whereby self is understood as virtual but actualizing. (Clowes, 2015a). This approach relates to some ideas of Thomas Metzinger, but whereas Metzinger claims the self is virtual and therefore inexistent, I claim that the self is virtual and real. Recently the project has also looked at the concept of presence in embodiment and how this idea can be developed to give an embodied theory of mental representation (Clowes & Mendonça, 2015 Online First).
From the 2014 renewal of the project it has deepened its secondary focus around how the mind can virtually appropriate technologies. Especially, the new class of digital media portable and wearable technologies we might call Cloud Tech. The project has examined how these technologies might be incorporated in human cognitive architecture focusing on the cognitive and empirical implications for the human mind (Clowes, 2013, 2014a, 2014b, 2015b). Latterly the project has begun to investigate the ethical side of this relationship. This work is currently being developed into a monograph provisionally title Thinking in The Cloud.
Press.
Clark, A. (2008). Supersizing the Mind: Oxford University Press.
Clowes, R. W. (2013). The cognitive integration of E-memory. Review of Philosophy and Psychology(4), 107-133.
Clowes, R. W. (2014a). Faceache: WEB 2.0, Safety Culture, The End of Intimacy and the Implosion of Private Life. In F. Negro (Ed.), Público Privado, o deslizar de uma fronteira (pp. 279-298). Lisbon, Portugal.
Clowes, R. W. (2014b, November 3-5). Reading, New Media Technology and what they tell us about Social Cognition. Paper presented at the European Conference on Social Intelligence, Barcelona.
Clowes, R. W. (2015a). The Reality of the Virtual Self as Interface to the Social World. In J. Fonseca & J. Gonçalves (Eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on Self (pp. 221-276). Lisbon: Peter Lang.
Clowes, R. W. (2015b). Thinking in the cloud: The Cognitive Incorporation of Cloud-Based Technology. Philosophy and Technology, 28, Issue 2, (2), 261-296. Retrieved from http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs13347-014-0153-z#page-1
Clowes, R. W., & Chrisley, R. (2012). Virtualist Representation. International Journal of Machine Consciousness, 04(02), 503-522. Retrieved from http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S179384301240029X
Clowes, R. W., & Mendonça, D. (2015 Online First). Representation Redux: Is there still a useful role for representation to play in the context of embodied, dynamicist and situated theories of mind? New Ideas in Psychology, Special Issue on Representation.
Metzinger, T. (2004). Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity. Cambridge, MA: Bradford Book.
Noë, A. (2004). Action in perception. Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books, MIT Press.
Revonsuo, A. (2006). Inner Presence: Consciousness as a Biological Phenomenon: MIT Press.
Thompson, E. (2007). Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind: Belknap
Clowes, R. W. (2013). The cognitive integration of E-memory. Review of Philosophy and Psychology(4), 107-133.
Clowes, R. W. (2014a). Faceache: WEB 2.0, Safety Culture, The End of Intimacy and the Implosion of Private Life. In F. Negro (Ed.), Público Privado, o deslizar de uma fronteira (pp. 279-298). Lisbon, Portugal.
Clowes, R. W. (2014b, November 3-5). Reading, New Media Technology and what they tell us about Social Cognition. Paper presented at the European Conference on Social Intelligence, Barcelona.
Clowes, R. W. (2015a). The Reality of the Virtual Self as Interface to the Social World. In J. Fonseca & J. Gonçalves (Eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on Self (pp. 221-276). Lisbon: Peter Lang.
Clowes, R. W. (2015b). Thinking in the cloud: The Cognitive Incorporation of Cloud-Based Technology. Philosophy and Technology, 28, Issue 2, (2), 261-296. Retrieved from http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs13347-014-0153-z#page-1
Clowes, R. W., & Chrisley, R. (2012). Virtualist Representation. International Journal of Machine Consciousness, 04(02), 503-522. Retrieved from http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S179384301240029X
Clowes, R. W., & Mendonça, D. (2015 Online First). Representation Redux: Is there still a useful role for representation to play in the context of embodied, dynamicist and situated theories of mind? New Ideas in Psychology, Special Issue on Representation.
Metzinger, T. (2004). Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity. Cambridge, MA: Bradford Book.
Noë, A. (2004). Action in perception. Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books, MIT Press.
Revonsuo, A. (2006). Inner Presence: Consciousness as a Biological Phenomenon: MIT Press.
Thompson, E. (2007). Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind: Belknap
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